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Abstract 
 
To most individuals, “trust” can be viewed as a knowledge corporate asset that may add, or rest, value to 
the company. The role of knowledge in achieving a competitive advantage is becoming and increasingly 
important management issue in all business and non-business sectors. As such, our Throughput 
Modeling approach indicates how six different trust behaviors can be guided, how trust decision making 
can be improved and made defensible, and how special problems facing individuals can be dealt with 
via decision-making pathways leading to an action. 
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Trust affects individuals’ relationships with other personnel in an organization 
(Edvinsson & Malone 1997), and can lead to superior information sharing and lower 
transaction cost (Dyer, 1997; Uzzi, 1997).  For example, individuals trust releasing personnel 
information to their employees than to outsiders (Eddy, Stone, & Stone-Romero, 1999). 
When trust is present, communication and problem solving are relatively easy.  When distrust 
occurs, productivity and the value of the firm can suffer significantly (Sparrowe, Liden, 
Wayne & Kraimer  2001). Researchers (Noordewier, John, & Nevin  1990) have advocated 
that trust lowers transaction costs in more uncertain environment, thus providing companies 
with a source of competitive advantage (Barney & Hansen  1994).  Parkhe and Miller (2000) 
argued that distrust emerges when the suspicion arises that the disruption of expectations in 
one exchange is likely to generalize all through other exchanges.  Further, without an 
attribution of “intentionality,” trust can be disrupted, that is no trust, without producing 
distrust.  Trust improves long-term relationships between firms (Ganesan 1994), and is an 
important element in successful strategic alliances (Gulati 1995)1.  In addition, Doney, 
Cannon, and Mullen (1998) advocated that trust contributes to enhanced manager-
subordinate relationships.  Recently, a number of researchers have acknowledged that trust 
may not always be functional and distrust is not always dysfunctional.  For example, some 
researchers have advocated that low levels of trust can also be associated with better decision 
making and less likelihood of being exploited (Wicks, Berman & Jones, 1999). 
We provide additional insights into “trust” as a corporate knowledge asset by 
depicting it as part of a decision making model.  The idea is that different conceptions of trust 
as a corporate knowledge asset can lead to alternative pathways supporting decisions.  
                                               
1
 Some researchers (Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone, 1998) suggest that interpersonal trust has an 
individual referent and origin. Others (Fukuyama, 1995) argue that the level of trust inherent 
in the society conditions the economic success and competitiveness of a nation.  Given these 
perspectives, our notion of trust is multilevel that can emerge into a knowledge asset. 
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Knowing which pathways support decisions may assist corporate strategies providing to 
competitive advantages.  
In this way, we contribute to the existing field of knowledge by demonstrating how 
different trust positions can strongly influence the pathways individuals take in order to make 
a decision. This Throughput Model provides a broad conceptual framework for examining 
interrelated processes that have an impact on decisions effecting organizations.  It 
incorporates the constructs of  (1) perception (framing), (2) presented information to the user, 
(3) judgment (analysis of information/ experiences), and (4) decision choice as it applies to 
individuals. Our purpose in this article is to analyze six different trust positions that are the 
bases for corporate knowledge assets in terms of individuals.  We use a decision making 
model to identify and analyze these levels that encourage or constrain trustworthy behavior in 
organizations.  In doing so, we provide insight into how organizations can create an 
environment that supports trustworthy behavior as a knowledge asset.   
The Throughput model may assist researchers by linking trust positions to the real 
world upfront, so that the results of the research process may later be of greater use to 
practice.  Kramer (1999) indicated that when conceptualized as a psychological state, trust 
has been defined in terms of several interrelated cognitive processes and orientations.  
Further, our model may arrest some of the researchers’ concerns (e.g., Mayer, Davis & 
Schoorman, 1995) regarding (1) the difficulty of defining trust, (2) confusing trust with its 
framing and outcomes, (3) depicting the relationship between trust and risk for different trust 
positions, (4) better understanding different decision pathways supporting trust, and (5) 
helping to consider the particular trust position the trusting party and the party to be trusted 
are implementing. 
This paper is organized as follows: first, a definition, levels and six positions of trust 
as a knowledge asset are discussed.  Second, these six trust perspectives are integrated in a 
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Throughput Model.  The model pathways highlight the importance of how the six different 
trust positions influence individuals in arriving at a decision.  Finally, a summary pertaining 
to the effectiveness of viewing trust in a decision-making context is discussed. 
 
TRUST AS A CORPORATE KNOWLEDGE ASSET 
 
Trust Defined 
 
Trust is a term that has acquired many meanings and every discipline view trust from 
its own unique perspective (Singleton, Straits, Straits & McAllister, 1988). Trust means 
reliance on the ability, integrity, predictability etc. of an individual in other individuals. Trust 
also involves feelings, values, beliefs, and risk2.  Boon and Holmes (1991) define trust as “a 
state involving confident positive expectations about another’s motives with respect to 
oneself in situations entailing risk” (p. 194).3  Similarly, Robinson (1996) stated trust as an 
individual’s “expectations, assumptions, or beliefs about the likelihood that another’s future 
actions will be beneficial, favorable, or at least not detrimental to one’s interests” (p. 576).   
The relationship of trust with reciprocity, opportunism, and forbearance (Parkhe 1993) may 
affect the structure of trust.  This structure of trust is based upon one willfully submitting to 
another resulting in vulnerability, mutual interdependence, uncertainty, and partial loss of 
control.  In summary, Doney, Cannon, and Mullen review of the extant literature in 
economics, organization behavior, psychology and sociology revealed two consistent themes: 
(1) trust as a set of beliefs or expectations, and (2) trust as a willingness to act on those beliefs 
(1998, p. 603).   
                                               
2
 Mcknight and Chervany (2002) study reported that competence, predictability, benevolence, 
and integrity represented the most dominant definitions of trust in the literature.  These 
results were based on about 80 articles and books from the fields of psychology/social 
psychology, sociology/economics/political science, and management/communications.  
3Following Deutsch (1962), trusting behavior is defined as consisting of actions that: (1) 
increase one’s vulnerability, (2) another’s behavior is not under one’s control, (3) the penalty 
(disutility) one suffers if the other abuses that vulnerability is greater than the benefit (utility) 
one gains if the other does not abuse that vulnerability.    
 5 
In this paper, we adopt a definition of trust that is considered to be widely held by 
contemporary and cross-disciplinary scholars as reported by Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and 
Camerer  (1998).  This view states that, “trust is a psychological state comprising the 
intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or 
behavior of another” (1998, p. 395).  This contemporary view reflects the underlying 
disciplines of economics, marketing, organization behavior, psychology, sociology, and 
strategy.   
Trust Assets 
 In the literature, the term “reputation,” viewed as a knowledge asset, 
sometimes includes competence and integrity.  Doney and Cannon (1997) defined an 
organization’s reputation as the extent to which customers believe that the firm is honest and 
concerned about them. The role of trust in achieving a competitive advantage is becoming an 
increasingly important management issue in all business and non-business sectors.  Thus, 
trust attributes include the concept of reputation as a knowledge asset.  Companies are 
increasingly relying on building trust as a knowledge asset in order to survive in their 
respective competitive marketplace (Matusik & Hill 1998).  Knowledge assets have become 
the most strategic factor in companies motivating managers to focus on its acquisition, 
production, movement, retention and application (Spender 1996). That is, the knowledge-
driven economy is not just about new high-tech industries built on a science base like 
software and biotechnology.  It is centered on “trust” that provide the ability to innovate and 
create new products and exploit new markets (Sveiby  1997).  Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) 
reported that the literature on knowledge assets suggests the view that the combination and 
exchange of knowledge are complex social processes, and that much valuable knowledge is 
fundamentally socially embedded.  
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Flamholz (1999) argued that the economies of many nations are increasingly 
dominated by knowledge or information-based sectors driven by highly trained and 
specialized personnel. The growing significance of human capital as a determinant of 
economic success at both the macroeconomic and microeconomic level implies “trust value” 
substantiates that firms need to adjust to this new economic reality. The concept of trust value 
in corporate knowledge assets has essentially two different meanings.  First, it’s an essential 
element supporting the usefulness of a particular resource or utility.  Second, it has the power 
of purchasing goods or purchasing power. The former is termed “use value” and the latter is 
termed “exchange value” (Flamholtz 1985).  The role of knowledge in achieving a 
competitive advantage is becoming an increasingly important management issue in all 
business and non-business sectors.  If trust behavior can be viewed as a prerequisite for a 
company to function in an orderly way, then it follows that “trust” is the glue that binds a 
company together.  In this light, trust is viewed as a corporate asset.   
Individuals’ Level of Trust as a Knowledge Asset 
Individual knowledge assets include attitudes, perceptions, and abilities of employees; and 
their motivation, commitment, and adaptability to the company.  The individual level 
contains consideration of the psychological basis of trust and distrust among individuals.  
Organizations have generally experienced declines in their perceived trustworthiness by 
employees and members of other organizations.  Studies have shown that declining trust 
reflects a general social phenomenon (Lipset & Schneider 1983) and questionable 
management practices (Sheppard, Lewicki & Minton 1992).  Trust affects individuals’ 
positions within social networks by influencing advantages such as, their organizational 
assimilation and promotions, while distrust can lead to disadvantages such as organizational 
exit (Sparrowe, Liden, Wayne & Kraimer, 2001).   
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Trust is viewed as a psychological construct arising through cognition requiring social 
structure for its formation (Luhmann, 1979).  The object of trust may be an individual 
(Larzelere & Huston, 1980) or an institution (Shapiro, 1987).  Research studies (Kramer 
1999) have demonstrated that the level of trust in a relationship affects the degree of 
defensiveness.  That is, individuals can have difficulty in concentrating on messages, 
perceived motives, values and emotions of others less accurately, and an increased distortion 
of messages.  Therefore interpersonal or organizational trust is required for effective problem 
solving in a group or in organized capital markets worldwide.    
Trust Positions 
We discuss six prominent trust positions as a corporate knowledge asset in the context 
of a decision making model. These six trust positions are considered by some researchers to 
be useful in depicting individual’s behavior (Arrow 1974; Kreps 1990; Miller 1992; Kramer 
1999).  They are (1) trust as a rational choice, (2) rule-based trust, (3) category-based trust, 
(4) third parties as conduits of trust, (5) role-based trust, (6) history-based trust/ dispositional-
based trust. The six trust positions presented in this paper include economic, legal, 
psychological, and sociological perspectives affecting individuals as corporate knowledge 
assets.4 
That is, interpersonal matters influence rule-based trust, third parties as conduits of 
trust, and history-based trust/ dispositional-based trust more.  Trust as a rational choice, rule-
based trust, and category-based trust areas lean more to dispositional trust.   
Trust as a rational choice is a subset of individuals motivated to act in their perceived 
self-interest. Trust as a rational choice is motivated by a “conscious calculation of 
advantages, a calculation that in turn is based on an explicit and internally consistent value 
                                               
4
 Some researchers refer to these positions as interpersonal (i.e., relational) and dispositional 
trust issues.  Although, some of the trust positions have more of a dispositional nature than 
others, this paper discussion centers on interpersonal trust issues. 
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system” (Schelling  1960, p. 4).  That is, people are motivated to make rational, efficient 
choices (i.e., maximize expected gains or minimize expected losses from their transactions) 
(Williamson, 1993).  
The rule-based trust emphasizes rules individuals rely upon, and on their judgments 
associated with a particular decision process rather than on its choices (deontology).  
Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies (1998) assert that rule-based trust (deterrence-based) arises 
from the notion that you trust someone due to a very strict normative rule or legal system is in 
force. Rule-based trust, both formal and informal, depicts much of the knowledge members 
have about explicit and tacit understandings (March 1994).  It is based on shared 
understandings regarding the system of rules regarding appropriate behavior.  For example, 
partners draw up an extensive contract that specifies the rights and obligations of the contract 
partners, and decide on the penalties when one of the parties fails to meet its obligations. 
The category-based trust is concerned with group membership.  It also reflects that 
the greatest trust for an individual is based upon the trust of the organization (utilitarianism). 
Category-based trust refers to information regarding an individual’s membership in an 
organizational category (Brewer 1996).  For example, membership in a fraternity or sorority 
can provide a basis for presumptive trust. 
The third parties as conduits of trust assume that decision-makers use second-hand 
information from people around them as their basis for defining ethical standards (relativist). 
Third parties as conduits of trust are based upon “second-hand” knowledge about others 
(Burt & Knez  1995; Shah  1998).  This source of knowledge however, on trust judgments is 
complex and not always in the service of rational assessment of others’ trust. For example, 
employees rely on others to help them evaluate and comprehend their performance, 
compensation, career trajectories, and work duties. 
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The role-based trust is a function of the popularity or importance of title or position, 
whereby the cultivation of virtuous traits of character is viewed as morality’s primary 
function (virtue of ethics).  According to personality-based trust researchers, trust develops 
over time influenced by role players such as parents, teachers etc. (Bowlby, 1982) resulting in 
a general tendency to trust others. Role-based trust is predicated on knowledge that an 
individual occupies a particular role in the organization rather than specific knowledge about 
the individual’s capabilities, dispositions, motives, and intentions.  That is, roles can serve as 
proxies for personalized knowledge about other organizational members (Fisher, Gunz & 
McCutcheon  2001). For example, certified public accountants’ opinion statement on a 
company’s well being is viewed as a signal that the information can be relied upon for 
investing and crediting purposes. 
The history-based/ dispositional trust focuses on a set of historical character traits that 
are deeply valued in close personal relationships in detail or in general, such as sympathy, 
compassion, fidelity, love, friendship, and the like (ethics of care). History-based trust 
indicates people’s perceptions of others’ trust are dependent on previous encounters (Boon & 
Holmes 1991).  That is, interactional histories provide a person with information that is useful 
in assessing others’ dispositions, intentions, and motives.  Further, this information provides a 
basis for drawing inferences about their trust and for making predictions about their future 
behavior.  
Dispositional trust is predicated on decision makers’ early trust-related experiences 
shaping their general beliefs about other people (Rotter  1980).  Dispositional trust tends to be 
more general when applied to people in general, whereas history-based trust relates to more 
specific incidences.  For example, some customers have purchased from a particular company 
over the past five years.  These customers believe that they should receive additional 
discounts on their purchases based upon their past loyalty and prompt payments to the 
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company.  Their decision to continue to purchase goods from the company is centered on the 
purchase discount negotiations with the company. History-based trust and dispositional trust 
are viewed as a continuum in that we combine past and present. 
Table 1 provides examples of the relationship among individuals with (1) rational 
choice, (2) rule-based trust, (3) category-based trust, (4) third parties as conduits of trust, (5) 
role-based trust, (6) history-based trust/ dispositional-based trust.   
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Insert Table 1 about here 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
TRUST INTEGRATED IN A THROUGHPUT MODEL 
The Throughput Model 
We present a theoretical model that attempts to clarify the multiple ways in which 
trust serves as a knowledge asset that can increase or decrease value. This Throughput Model 
(Rodgers 1997) captures several different pathways and stages that can influence a decision 
at the individual level. Further, depending upon individuals or organizations’ viewpoint, 
certain pathways may be weighted heavier than or dominate other pathways. Decision-
makers can benefit from this model by observing what other pathways may need to be 
improved in order to modify their decisions.  Finally, this novel approach enables us to 
complement several “trust” approaches with unique decision-making paths leading to a 
decision.  
Throughput Modeling depicts the most influential pathways employed in arriving at a 
decision.  That is, what we hold as valuable enters into our perception of the information.  
Our judgments about what the information is, what is acceptable as information, what 
evidence we will believe, and what theory is appropriate to answer questions about a 
particular part of reality are all influenced by what we hold as valuable (Rodgers & Gago 
2001). Decision making in the Throughput Model is defined here as a multi-stage, 
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information-processing function in which cognitive, economic, and social processes are used 
to generate a set of outcomes.   
Perception involves the process of individuals framing their problem solving set or 
view of the world (Sitkin & Weingart, 1995).   Depending upon the task at hand, this framing 
involves individuals’ expertise in using pre-formatted knowledge to direct and guide their 
search of confirming or disconfirming of incoming information necessary for problem 
solving or decision making. Rodgers (1997) argued that perception represents a person’s 
expertise, classifying and categorization of information. For example, a supplier delivers 
products on a timely basis based upon the purchaser promise to pay cash.  Information 
includes the set of financial and non-financial information available to a decision-maker for 
problem solving purposes. The judgment stage contains the process individuals’ implement to 
analyze incoming information (financial and non-financial), as well as the influences from 
the perception stage.  From these sources, rules are implemented to weigh, sort, and classify 
knowledge and information for problem solving or decision-making purposes. Finally, in the 
decision choice stage an action is taken or not taken. 
There are differences of opinion about how many stages and subroutines within stages 
exist and the order in which the stages occur.  These concepts in the model proposed here 
appear with some consistency in the literature (Hogarth 1987).  This model represents a 
parsimonious way to capture major concepts about organizations.  Further, it provides a more 
interpretative cognitive schema.  That is, basic information processing modeling normally 
involves serial processing.  We take this approach one step further by assuming parallel 
processing.  That is we assume that there are many (often times simultaneous) pathways 
leading to a decision.  Further, this decision-making model has been shown to be useful in 
conceptualizing a number of different issues important to organizations (Rodgers  1997).  It is 
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particularly relevant for clarifying critical pathways influenced by ethical positions (Rodgers 
& Gago  2001).   
 The conceptual model is presented in Figure 1.   Arrows from one construct to 
another indicate the hypothesized causal relationships. In Figure 1, perception does not 
change the actual information, but influences an individual on what type, kind and magnitude 
of information will be selected for further processing.  Also, information can influence, 
change, or alter an individual’s perception based on the importance of the information 
(Rodgers 1997).  Therefore Figure 1 presents perception and information as interdependent. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
A point of clarification regarding the interdependence between perception and 
judgment is that the pathway shown as P → I is a continuous forward and backward path (see 
Figure 1).  Also, this pathway suggests that perception dominate information.  Thus, when the 
path direction is P → I, we suggest that P dominates I in an individual’s actions toward 
reaching a decision.  When the direction of the arrow is reversed: P ← I implies that I 
dominates P and an individual’s primary method of decision making is via information 
(Rodgers 1997). 
Based on Figure 1, we can establish six general pathways: 
 
P → D      (1) 
P → J→ D     (2) 
I→ J→ D     (3) 
I→ P → D     (4) 
P → I→ J→ D     (5)     
I→ P → J→ D    (6) 
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To provide an empirical foundation for the six decision making pathways, Rodgers 
(1992; 1997) performed a covariance structural analysis with unobservable variables, based 
on a survey of loan officers’ and novices’ perception, information, judgment, and decision.  
The results of his calculation from his survey, the coefficients, represent the relations 
between the analyzed variables.  A coefficient, r, is a number such that: − ≤ ≤ +1 1r . Overall 
coefficients, greater than 0.5, had more influence on a concrete pathway, whereas coefficients 
less than 0.5 had a weak effect on the variables associated with each pathway (Rodgers 1992, 
1997).  
Trust Viewed in the Throughput Model  
Throughput modeling begins with individuals stating their views of what should be 
done.  The advantage of this approach is that it helps decision-makers understand why 
individuals have selected some information, which supports their position, and have ignored 
other information, which does not support their position. This approach helps uncover the 
observations and values that individuals rely upon when taking positions on issues.  Also, the 
model is useful in depicting latter stages of processes, such as judgment, that are 
implemented in supporting individuals’ positions. 
The model begins with how an individual thinks and places importance on perceived 
trust issues.  Therefore, perception is interdependent with information in Figure 1.  According 
to Edvinsson and Malone (1997, p. 32) in the context of business, a trust issue has 
consequences for others inside the organization and/or external to the organization in terms of 
valuing corporate knowledge assets.  The intensity of an ethical issue relates to the perceived 
importance of the issue to the decision-maker (Jones 1991).  Hence, perception can influence 
the type of information selected for later processing in the model, or information can 
influence or change the way individuals’ perceive the problem (Rodgers 1997).   
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In the perception stage, perceived trust is a critical cognitive predictor of trust (Mayer, 
Davis & Schoorman 1995).  In addition, researchers from diverse areas agree that trust 
develops through repeated social interactions about others’ trust (McAlister 1995; Sheppard 
& Sherman, 1998; Williams 2001).  Finally, Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995) asserted 
that trustworthiness could be depicted into three basic categories of ability, benevolence and 
integrity. They further indicated that people’s perceptions of others’ ability, benevolence, and 
integrity explain a major portion of the variance in perceived trust.  Ability refers to a set of 
skills or competencies that allow a person to perform in some area.  Benevolence suggests a 
desire to care for the protection of another, and the perception of integrity embraces the belief 
that another attaches to a set of principles that one finds acceptable (Williams 2001). 
 The judgment stage contains the process individuals’ implement to analyze incoming 
information as well as the influences from the perception stage.  From these sources, rules are 
implemented to weight, sort, and classify knowledge and information for problem solving or 
decision-making purposes. This particular stage involves the ability to structure contracts or 
rewards and punishments (Bhattacharya, Devinney & Pillutla  1998).  Since this stage 
attempts to provide structure on trust, it can be referred to as economic or “rationalist” mode 
of trust (Zucker  1986).    
 In the Throughput Model, information (circle I in Figure 1) also affects judgment.  For 
example, information stored in memory affects decision makers' evaluations of perceived 
trust issues.  Typically, before an individual can make a decision, that individual encodes the 
information and develops a representation for the problem (Johnson-Laird  1981).  Finally in 
Figure 1, perception and judgment can affect decision choice.  Some researchers, notably 
Kahneman and Tversky (1982), have suggested that both automatic, perception-like 
heuristics and more deliberate information processing strategies (judgment) are involved in 
most decision choices.  Errors, biases, and context-dependent heuristics may result from 
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cognitive mechanisms of which decision makers are largely unaware, and these may have a 
direct impact on decision choice (Rodgers  1992).  The strategies of judgment that influence 
decision choice are under individual’s deliberate control.  
The decision-making processes of individuals can be represented in an organized 
manner.  In order to study the methods of these decision processes it is important to break up 
all the paths marked with arrows in Figure 1 into sets of individual pathways.  These 
fragments can then be independently analyzed for their contributing properties to individuals’ 
decision processes (Rodgers, 1997).  Further, it is common for decision-makers to differ in 
their trust values.  Even if two individuals agree on the trust principles that determine 
trustworthy behavior, it is unlikely that they will agree on the relative importance of each 
principle.  These differences are highlighted in Figure 1, depicting several pathways toward 
making a decision. 
The Throughput Model captures an understanding of simultaneous trust, distrust, and 
no trust within relationships (Bigley & Pearce  1998; Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies  1998). We 
concur with Lewicki, McAllister and Bies (1998) that trust represents confident positive 
expectations regarding another’s conduct, and distrust represents confident negative 
expectations regarding another’s conduct. Also, we consider a “no trust” confident 
expectations concept, following Parkhe and Miller (2000) discussion that trust can be 
disrupted by noise problems that can hinder agreements, and that are not intentional. Finally, 
similar to Jeffries and Reed (2000) and Lewicki, McAllister and Bies (1998) we assume in 
our model high and low trust values that it allows for a differentiation of containing and 
managing social uncertainty and complexity (Luhmann 1979).  
We associate trust (high, low), no trust and distrust (low, high) in the pathways with 
values that vary from +1 (the highest trust) to –1 (the highest distrust).  We use positive, 
negative and zero signs to represent trust, distrust, and no trust.  That is, each path can have a 
 16 
positive (+), negative (-), or zero (0) flow going through it that can be represented 
numerically for trust, distrust, and no trust, respectively. The sign of the flow is dependent 
upon the relative importance of the use of that pathway involving trust.  In order to give 
direction to a necessary pattern in trust, distrust, and no trust, we assume that any coefficient 
that is larger than or equal to 0.5, in absolute value, is considered supportive of a high trust 
effect.  Any coefficient that is smaller than 0.5, in absolute value, imply a weak trust effect of 
the variables associated with that path (Figure 2).   
Six Decision-Making Trust Pathways  
The model proposed here takes a unique approach to conceptualizing six trust 
positions to the above six decision-making pathways in understanding behavior (Rodgers & 
Gago  2001).  The six trust positions introduced in the previous section are: trust as a (1) 
rational choice, (2) rule-based trust, (3) category-based trust, (4) third parties as conduits of 
trust, (5) role-based trust, (6) history-based trust/dispositional-based trust (Figure 2). These 
six pathways are viewed as the most dominant and influential for decision making dominated 
by particular trust positions.  Although, it is important to note that other pathways in the 
Throughput Model also contributes to the above trust positions. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Insert Figure 2 about  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
The paths drawn are the pathways with large absolute value coefficients, thus they are 
the ones influencing individuals’ decision choices the most. Since this analysis is not just a 
theoretical exercise, we need only find the combinations that make sense for our specific 
application, i.e., our decision makers must make a decision.  Therefore, all zero pathway 
combinations can be disregarded when they lead to no decision.  Hence, all the pathways 
drawn represent logically possible pathways that yield decisions.  Even with this reduction in 
number of combinations, it is clear: decision makers’ processes can involve a series of 
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complicated steps. These six pathways are viewed as the most significant in our decision 
making model when considering particular trust perspectives. 
 In statement (1) P→ D implies that all information from I is disregarded and decision 
is made without any judgment.  Lipshitz and Strauss (1997) advocated that there are three 
basic issues surrounding downplaying data sources, namely those reflecting incomplete 
information, inadequate understanding, and undifferentiated alternatives.  These basic issues 
may downplay an individual’s use of information during the first stage of processing. 
P → D represents the shortest pathway, that is to say, the quickest way for achieving a 
goal: individuals perceive and decide on. Since perception and information are 
interdependent, individuals’ framing of the problem is constantly updated. Trust as a rational 
choice implies that individuals are always motivated to act in their perceived self-interest.  
Decisions about trust are similar to other forms of risky choice in that individuals are 
presumed to be motivated to make rational and efficient choices.  That is, individuals act to 
maximize expected gains or minimize expected losses from their transactions.  Hence, if the 
risk is low or monetary amount involved in the transaction (e.g., internet), then this 
perspective may serve well for low levels of trusting behavior between parties (Castelfranchi 
and Tan, 2002). This perspective includes two central elements (Hardin, 1991).  First, the 
knowledge that enables an individual to trust another is considered. Second, relates to the 
incentives of the individual who is trusted to honor that trust. This type of trust is based on a 
complete understanding with the other party’s desires and intentions. Therefore, this type of 
trust allows one to act as an “agent” for the other and substitute for the other in interpersonal 
transactions (Whitener, Berman and Jones 1998).  Hardin (1991) stated “You can more 
confidently trust me if you know that my interest will induce me to live up to your 
expectations.  Your trust then encapsulates my interests” (p. 189).   
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 P→ J→ D depicts the rule-based trust and emphasizes the rules used by individuals.  
That is, rules depend on the structure of the decision as well as the interpersonal behavior of 
the implementers of the decision.  The structural and interpersonal components of rules are 
likely to influence perceived trust (Brockner & Siegel, 1996).  An individual forms a 
perception without the use of any information, weighs the possible outcomes before making 
any judgment and then concludes with a decision.  This viewpoint examines the judgmental 
effects on decision choices.  A basic premise to this viewpoint is that equal respect must be 
given to all individuals.  Therefore, the judgment stage implements decision rules that help 
guide individuals to a decision.   
Trust in the authority that will enforce the contract could increase the level of trust in 
contracting situations (Castelfranchi and Tan, 2002).  Hummels and Roosendaal (2001) 
asserted that one way to deal with complexity is to draw up an extensive contract that 
specifies the rights and obligations of the contract partners and to decide on the penalties 
when one of the parties fail to meet its obligations.  For example, the value of corporate 
knowledge assets have increased due to creation of the new Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit in 1982 (Sullivan & Sullivan 2000), and rules govern intellectual property by the 
World Trade Organization (Contractor 2001). 
Rule-based-trust is also based on consistency of behavior in that individuals will do 
what they say they will do.  The interpersonal component of rules can consist of at least two 
major factors: (a) whether the reasons for the decision were clearly and adequately explained 
and (b) whether the implementers treated the individuals affected by the decision with dignity 
and respect (Bies 1987).  Behavioral consistency is adhered to by the threat of punishment 
(e.g., loss of business relationship) that will occur if consistency is not maintained.  Other 
studies have indicated that justice perceptions predict several attitudes and behaviors 
(Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng. 2001), and perceptions of fairness are formed and 
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exist in a social context in which employees might be influenced by conversations with their 
coworkers (Jones & Skarlicki, 2003).  
Statement (2) P→ J→ D implies that information from I is disregarded, as above, and 
a decision is reached via judgment.  There are at least several reasons for this occurrence. 
First, information may be disregarded due to its unreliability.  For example, a pre-medical 
student depiction of a patient illness would not carry the same weight as an experienced 
medical doctor.  Another reason for ignoring information may result from noise interfering 
with the main signal or message.  In this particular scenario, the decision maker may be 
confused regarding the intended message of the information.  Finally, conflicting 
informational signals may obfuscate a decision-maker from determining the proper weights 
to place on the information sources. 
For example, during the final campaign election days the friends of a Spanish 
politician broke the law by being involved in illicit situations. The Press denounced it and 
resulting pressure caused the renouncing of his candidacy, even though he was attacked 
without valid reasons.  Evidently the press accused the politicians (D) based on their 
perceptions regarding friendship involvement with certain people (P), judging (J) that he was 
at fault.  
I→ J→ D pathway reflects that category-based trust is predicated on norms of 
obligation and cooperation rooted in social similarity.  That is, it is the expectation that an 
individual can or cannot be trusted (i.e., high, low or no-trust) because of age, ethnicity, 
family background, financial position, religion, social reasons or status, and so forth. 
Category-based trust may extend broadly within a society (e.g., Japan) and may be reinforced 
by ritual and symbolic behaviors (Dore 1987) that emphasize common group membership 
and familiarity (Good 1988).  Williams (2001) argued that competitive or cooperative 
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interdependence that exists between two groups influences individuals’ beliefs about group 
members’ trust and the affect associated with them.  
Common characteristics within a category may provide an impetus to trust and may 
provide a positive, self-reinforcing process of interaction.  Because of the cognitive 
consequences of categorization and in-group bias, individuals tend to attribute positive 
characteristics such as honesty, cooperativeness, and trust to other in-group member (Brewer 
1996). However, common characteristics not found could provide an untrusting atmosphere 
when confronted with a dilemma.  Institutional form may acquire legitimacy based on 
perceptions about the trust of its representing authorities.  Powell and Dimaggio (1991) added 
that an institution is considered legitimate to the extent that its structure and procedures 
follow the dictates of prevailing rules and beliefs. 
I→ P → D highlights the third parties as conduits of trust and assumes that decision-
makers use themselves or the people around them as their basis for defining ethical standards.   
Third-party information serves to reinforce existing relations, making one’s perception more 
certain of his trust (or distrust) in another.  Therefore, trust depends on the direct connection 
between two individuals versus their indirect connections through third parties and the 
conditions in which the strong indirect connections that enhance trust reverse their effect to 
create distrust. Further, Blau (1964, pp. 112, 113) advocates that trust develops because social 
exchange involves unspecified obligations for which no binding contract can be written. 
Hence, trust is committed to an exchange before one knows how the other person will 
reciprocate.  Labianca, Brass and Gray’s (1998) study showed that third parties can be drawn 
into negative interpersonal interactions.  Finally, Shah (1998) advocated that employees rely 
on others to help them evaluate and comprehend their performance, compensation, career 
patterns, and work duties.  
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P → I→ J→ D under scores that role-based trust is tied to formal societal structures, 
depending on individual or firm-specific attributes.  An individual’s perceptions or framing 
of the problem will influence the selection and type of information to be employed in 
judgment.  That is, an individual is motivated to act appropriately (perception), which 
influences the information set (I) used to be analyzed (judgment) before a decision is made.  
This perspective suggests that a morally bound individual with good motivations is more 
likely to understand what task should be performed more so than a morally lacking individual 
(i.e., increasing the trust level).  Beauchamp and Bowie (1997, p. 39) advocated, “A person 
who simply follows rules of obligation and who otherwise exhibits no special moral character 
may not be trustworthy.” 
Examples of role-based trust are certification as an accountant or engineers. After the 
Enron’s scandal, the image of the accountant was affected thereby decreasing trust because 
the skill-based system that produces and maintains role-appropriate behavior of role players 
changed.  That is, more government laws were enacted thereby affecting the accounting 
profession integrity.  Dawes (1994) argued in this regard “We trust engineers because we 
trust engineering and believe that engineers are trained to apply valid principles of 
engineering, moreover, we have evidence every day that these principles are valid when we 
observe airplanes flying” (p. 24).  
Simon (1947) advanced that the willingness to accept an authority’s decisions can 
occur through courtesy to the authorities’ organizational role and can be made “independently 
of judgments of the correctness or acceptability of the premise [of their decisions]” (Simon 
1947, p. 125).  Further, Tyler and Degoey (1996) claimed that individuals’ evaluations of 
organizational authority trust shaped their willingness to accept the decisions of authorities as 
well as influencing feelings of obligation to follow organizational rules and laws.  In addition, 
Fisher, Gunz and McCutcheon (2001) advocated that individuals are bound together by 
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professional roles within society.  The importance of what that profession does places it in a 
special trust relationship with society, and has the potential both to help and harm the users of 
the services. 
 In the I→ P→ J→ D pathway, information dominates the perception in an “open-
minded” individual. This perspective represents the last possible fragmented way for 
individuals’ cognitive processes.  In this sequence, an individual studies the given 
information, frames the problem, and then proceeds to analyze the problem before rendering 
a decision.  Information helps guides an individual’s perceptual perspective. 
I→ P → J→ D represents the history-based trust and/or dispositional trust that arises 
either through the personal experience of recurring exchanges, such as purchasing inventory 
from a supplier, or in expectations based on reputation (i.e., low, high or no-trust).  This is 
similar to the notions that trust is a generalized response based on the reinforcement history 
inherent in previous social interactions (Rotter 1971).  This concept is further emphasized by 
early experience of such reinforcement is linked to the presence of an individual’s “personal 
philosophy” regarding individuals’ trust (Bowlby 1973). This “knowledge-based” trust is a 
judgment of the probability of the other’s likely choice of behaviors. It occurs when an 
individual has enough information about others to understand them and accurately predict 
their likely behavior.  In a long-term relationship, reciprocity is at the heart of this process.  
Through this process, business transactions become part of the social context where personal 
factors intertwine with economic considerations (Bradach & Eccles 1989).  In sum, the 
security and stability of such recurring reciprocal exchanges enable learning and engender 
trust (Powell, 1990).  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 The links among knowledge production and its exchanges are becoming an 
increasingly important management issue in all sectors.  People in companies contribute not 
only to produce tangible goods, but also intellectual goods. This creation of knowledge 
requires an adequate diffusion inside the company for achieving a positive organizational 
impact. The effectiveness of such processes is conditioned by trust.  
Trust behavior is a prerequisite for knowledge production and its exchanges. Individuals are 
not machines, they think and have feelings. When they pursue activities or communicate 
ideas, they are trusting in others.  Trust integrated into a Throughput model offer several 
advantages to companies from a strategic point of view.  First, the model assists in the 
awareness of a particular pathway dominant in its decision-making and bases of trust as a 
knowledge asset. Managerial behavior and group membership relationships also have a trust 
bases.  That is, the effectiveness of the interchanges of knowledge created in the 
organizations is based upon trust. Trust positions in the Throughput model can be addressed 
as sources of competitive advantages. They may be used as valuable assets in the creation of 
organizational value. Second, the Throughput Model provides for analysis of information in 
relation to problem framing (perception) used in individuals’ decision-making processes. 
Third, the model helps to determine what pathways should be examined based upon levels of 
trust, no trust and distrust. Acting on the decisional routes, organizations can design and 
implement strategies in their aim of achieving different trust positions. Hence, trust is a 
knowledge corporate asset that may add, or rest, value to an organization. 
We concur with Parkhe and Miller (2000) statement that we are barely scratching the 
surface of issues in trust.  However, we believe that this paper takes an important step in 
advancing our knowledge regarding the relationship of trust tied to a decision making model 
as bases for corporate knowledge assets. 
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 Figure 1. Individuals’ Decision Processes Diagram 
Where P= perception, I= information, J= judgment, and D= decision choice. 
P
I
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Figure 2.  Trust’s influence in decision-making 
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Trust as a rational choice
Ruled-based trust
Category-based trust
Third parties as conduits of trust
Role-based trust
History-based trust
Dispositional-based trust
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Table 1.  Examples of Individuals’ Trust Levels 
TRUST PERSPECTIVES INDIVIDUAL  
TRUST AS A 
RATIONAL CHOICE 
Employees’ effort in completing their assignments is motivated by their wage.  
RULE-BASED TRUST An Army soldier is instructed   to obey certain military rules. These rules regulate 
his behavior.  For example, in the case of becoming a war prisoner, soldiers trust the 
validity of those rules for guiding their decision-making.  
CATEGORY-BASED 
TRUST 
Presumptive trust is given to an individual within a particular category. For 
example, a devote catholic a company’s money.   
THIRD PART AS 
CONDUITS OF TRUST 
A President gives the order to attack a nation based on information from an 
undisclosed party.    
ROLE-BASED TRUST Information is channeled through the company’s certified public accountant for 
approval and appropriateness for decision-making purposes.   
HISTORY BASED 
TRUST/ 
DISPOSITIONAL 
TRUST 
A manager must decide on an investment with a certain environmental risk. The 
manager understands from previous experience that by becoming environmentally 
proactive may prevent possible losses resulting in a bad image for the company.  
 
 
